The Sabah state government has reiterated its resolute position that the newly enacted Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency Act 2024 cannot be permitted to diminish the state's longstanding immigration autonomy, according to a statement delivered in the State Legislative Assembly on July 22. Datuk Joniston Bangkuai, who serves as Assistant Minister to the Chief Minister, emphasised that this stance represents a deliberate and uncompromising defence of what Sabah views as a fundamental constitutional entitlement rather than a negotiable administrative matter.
The government's formal objection has been communicated directly to Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim through official correspondence, with particular emphasis on Sabah's insistence that the state's own Immigration Department must continue as the designated authority managing all entry points throughout the state. This position reflects deeper concerns about institutional sovereignty—the question of which government body holds final decision-making power over who enters Sabah and under what circumstances. The distinction matters considerably because control over borders directly influences economic policy, labour management, security operations, and cultural integration across the state.
Crucially, Sabah's government has stressed that the authority to issue Not-To-Land notices—the formal administrative instrument preventing individuals from entering the state—must remain squarely within the Sabah State Immigration Department's jurisdiction. These notices represent a critical tool for state-level governance, allowing authorities to exclude persons deemed undesirable without requiring federal approval. The prospect of transferring this power to a federal agency based in another state or at the national capital raises questions about responsiveness, local knowledge, and the practical effectiveness of immigration enforcement tailored to Sabah's specific demographic and security circumstances.
While acknowledging that the new Act formally falls under federal legislative authority, Joniston stressed that Sabah's constitutional position cannot be compromised by ordinary federal legislation. The state's claim rests explicitly on Article V of the Malaysia Agreement 1963, the foundational document establishing the conditions under which Sabah and Sarawak agreed to join the Malaysian federation. This treaty-level protection means that immigration autonomy is not merely a matter of administrative convenience but rather a constitutional safeguard equivalent to the protections afforded to the special positions of the Malay rulers and Islam in the federal constitution. Tampering with these protections theoretically requires a much higher threshold of consensus than ordinary parliamentary legislation.
Responding to questions from Datuk Seri Wilfred Madius Tangau, a State Legislative Assembly member from the Tamparuli constituency, Joniston explained that the state government's decision to postpone the Act's implementation in Sabah was not obstruction but rather constitutional prudence. The postponement reflects a calculated waiting period during which the state government seeks explicit guarantees that implementation will not erode Sabah's special rights. This negotiating stance suggests that Sabah's leadership is not categorically opposed to the federal border agency's existence but rather insists on a delineation of powers that preserves state prerogatives.
The underlying tension reveals a broader anxiety among Sabah's political establishment about federal overreach. Past decades have witnessed various attempts to standardise state-level governance mechanisms with federal frameworks, often justified as improving efficiency or ensuring consistency across Malaysia. For Sabah, however, each such standardisation has carried the potential risk of diluting the distinctive constitutional position secured during the 1963 federation agreement. The accumulated effect of incremental erosions, even if individually modest, could eventually render Article V protections symbolic rather than substantive.
Chief Minister Datuk Seri Hajiji Noor had previously articulated this position with particular clarity on May 13, stating that Sabah's agreement to postpone the Act's implementation was conditional upon receiving ironclad guarantees protecting the state's special rights, immigration autonomy, and state authority. Hajiji emphasised that the very formation of Malaysia depended on granting immigration autonomy to both Sabah and Sarawak. This historical framing is significant because it locates immigration autonomy not as an arbitrary preference but as a foundational element of Malaysia's constitutional architecture. Without these protections, Hajiji implied, the federation itself would lack one of its original pillars.
The dispute carries implications extending well beyond Sabah's borders. Sarawak, which shares identical constitutional protections under MA63, watches these negotiations closely. Any concession by Sabah on immigration matters could establish precedent pressuring Sarawak to accept similar arrangements, potentially creating a domino effect that systematically reduces the special status of both East Malaysian states. Conversely, a successful Sabah defence of its Article V rights would strengthen constitutional protection for all MA63 provisions. This makes the current impasse significant for Malaysia's federalism architecture as a whole.
The Act's intent appears reasonable from a national security perspective—establishing a unified border control agency to standardise procedures and enhance coordination against transnational threats. However, the principle of federalism requires that such legitimate national objectives be pursued through mechanisms respecting state constitutional autonomy rather than circumventing it. The current standoff represents an attempt to balance these competing values: national security efficiency against constitutional protection of state rights. How this negotiation concludes could establish important precedent for how Malaysia reconciles federal governance objectives with the federal principle.
Sabah's insistence that immigration powers are non-negotiable reflects political maturity about constitutional matters. The state government recognises that once such powers are surrendered, reclaiming them becomes exponentially more difficult. Federal agencies, once granted authority, typically resist devolution. Political capital expended on future recovery could better be spent on pressing development and service delivery challenges. From this perspective, Sabah's firm stance during initial negotiations represents the most rational institutional strategy available to protect constituent interests over the long term.
